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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT AS A "PRINCIPAL
PLACE OF BUSINESS" UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
Higgins v. State Loan Company'
Appellant, employed for several years in the District
of Columbia, by an electric company, as an "electrical in-
staller", had resided and been domiciled in Maryland for
four years prior to the -filing of his voluntary petition in
the bankruptcy court of the District of Columbia. The
appellee creditor, on the theory that petitioner's employ-
ment by another did not constitute a "place of business"
within the meaning of Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act,
moved to dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction.
The referee denied the motion, but on review the District
Court reversed his ruling and dismissed the petition for
lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the dismissal of the peti-
tion by the District Court was affirmed.
This rather novel question takes on special importance
with the increasing tendency of urban workers to com-
mute long distances to their places of employment. Re-
search reveals no other appellate determination of this
issue.
The Bankruptcy Act2 gives the courts of bankruptcy
jurisdiction to "Adjudge persons bankrupt who have had
their principal place of business, resided or had their domi-
cil within their respective territorial jurisdictions for the
preceding six months, or for a longer portion of the pre-
ceding six months than in any other jurisdiction ... ".
The purpose of this provision of the Act is to compel pro-
ceedings to be maintained in the jurisdiction that will be
geographically most convenient to the parties interested,
chiefly the creditors. Active participation by creditors is
thereby encouraged, presumably causing fraud more read-
ily to be revealed and an undeserved discharge of the bank-
rupt more likely to be opposed. An adjudication in a jur-
isdiction inaccessible to creditors would not usually result
in the thorough threshing out of these issues that would
be possible when the adjudication is made in a jurisdic-
tion convenient to the creditors. As regards objections
to the bankrupt's discharge, this may not be of quite so
much importance since the enactment of the Chandler
Act,' which gives the trustee the right, on his own motion,
1 114 F. (2d) 25 (C. A. Dist. of Col., 1940).
2 Section 2a, 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. Ila.
3 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 14b, 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 32b; Section 47a, 11 U. S.
C. A. 75a.
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to resist the discharge. This right he did not have prior
to the Chandler Act.
4
In the principal case, the narrow issue before the
Court was whether or not the place where a person en-
gages in gainful activity, solely as a subordinate employee
of another, is a "place of business" within the meaning of
this provision of the Act. The ruling of the Court under
the particular facts, that this is not such a "place of busi-
ness", furthers the purpose of the above provision of the
Act.
Whether or not using the test of convenience as the
guiding principle in the determination of such an issue
will invariably lead to the same result is debatable. Ordi-
narily, it would seem a reasonable presumption that a
person living in one place and employed as a subordinate
in another place, contracts few, if any, personal debts in
the locality where he is employed. Such an employee
would usually establish his credit at his place of residence
or domicil and it is there that his creditors look to him
for payment. To enable one in such circumstances to be
adjudicated a bankrupt in the jurisdiction of his place of
employment, where there is no "holding out" of assets,
no establishment of a distinctive place of business of his
own, but rather a perhaps unidentifiable employment for
another, would be to invite undeserved discharges and
the concealment of fraud.
A factual situation is not improbable, however, in
which the majority or main creditors of the bankrupt
would find the jurisdiction of the place of employment
to be more convenient, and adjudication in such a District
less apt to result in concealment of fraud, or the obten-
tion of undeserved discharges. The Court, in the prin-
cipal case, though citing the cases of In Re Bailey,5 and
In Re Belcher6 as conflicting with the result reached in
the main case, nevertheless said that they "apparently
hold that employment in the District is sufficient [basis
for jurisdiction]." By this phrasing, the Court may be
recognizing the distinction based on the facts in the par-
ticular cases. In these two cases there are facts that
would warrant a distinction. In both, the bankrupt had
4 Prior to the Chandler Act, the Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 14, 11 U. S. C. A.,
Sec. 32, provided: ". . . the trustee shall not interpose objections to a
bankrupt's discharge until he shall be authorized so to do by the creditors
at a meeting of creditors called for that purpose on the application of any
creditor." In re Schnoll, 44 F. (2d) 857 (S. D. N. Y., 1930).
. 2 Fed. Cas. 392, No. 753 (S. D. N. Y., 1868).
6 3 Fed. Cas. 79, No. 1237 (S. D. N. Y., 1868).
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previously been in business for himself in the District of
subsequent employment. Particularly is this brought out
in the case of In Re Belcher7 where the bankrupt had for
twenty years been in business for himself as a merchant
in New York City. The bankrupt failed, moved his resi-
dence into New Jersey, and then continued to work as a
clerk under his successor at the same place of business.
Previous ownership of a business in the District wherein
there is a subsequent employment for another may well
be a fact which, when coupled with creditors whose
claims were derived from transactions arising out of the
prior business, would indicate a holding that an adjudi-
cation in that District would further the purpose of the
Act. A similar holding might be extended to cover the
case of a debtor who has obtained extensive personal
credit or loans in the city of employment, as might readily
happen to one occupying a responsible position as an em-
ployee of another, though residing elsewhere.
The question of determining the bankrupt's status
as proprietor or employee might arise where he had been
the prior owner of a business in the District but at the
time of filing the petition he is merely an employee. If a
court is to recognize such a distinguishing factor, should
it be decided by analogy to the last sentence of Section 4
of the Bankruptcy Act, which determines whether or not
the alleged bankrupt is a farmer or wage earner: "the
status of an alleged bankrupt as a wage earner or a farmer
shall be determined as of the time of the commission of
the act of bankruptcy."? Or should the Court be guided
solely by whether business or non-business creditors are
primarily claiming in bankruptcy in determining juris-
diction?
It is conceivable that if a broader construction were
given to the words "principal place of business" so as to
permit the filing of a petition in the jurisdiction where
an employee is employed, a proper elasticity could be
achieved. This would be safeguarded from abuse, if the
alleged bankrupt had committed an act of bankruptcy, by
the provisions of Section 328 of the Bankruptcy Act. If
creditors believe that the case should be transferred to
7 Ibid.
s Sec. 32, 11 U. S. C. A. 55: "Transfer of Cases. In the event petitions
are filed by or against the same person or by or against different members
of a partnership in different courts of bankruptcy each of which has juris-
diction, the cases shall, by order of the court first acquiring jurisdiction,
be transferred to and consolidated in the court which can proceed with
the same for the greatest convenience of parties In interest."
[VOL. V
1941] HIGGINS v. LOAN COMPANY 437
another jurisdiction because of the greater convenience
of the parties in interest, they could file a petition in the
more convenient jurisdiction and, if the court where the
original petition was filed was of the same opinion, the
case could be transferred as authorized by Section 32.
Any decision of a Court as to the basis of jurisdiction
under Section 2 of the Bankruptcy Act should be appli-
cable to the construction of those sections of the Act, deal-
ing with jurisdiction over the debtor under Chapter XI,
"Arrangements"9 ; Chapter XII, "Real Property Arrange-
ments" 0 ; and Chapter XIII, "Wage Earners' Plans"."
9 Sec. 322, 11 U. S. C. A. 722.
10 Sec. 422, 11 U. S. C. A. 822.
1 See. 622, 11 U. S. C. A. 1022.
